In the postwar era until recently, public-transfer shares of GDP have risen dramatically in every developed democracy. Much positive theory purports to explain this development as a direct consequence of differing distributions of political (votes) and economic (money) resources. This literature concludes, inter alia, that the size of tax-and-transfer systems (T&T) increases in the skew of the income distribution. This paper builds from that basis, suggesting theoretical additions and amendments deriving from further consideration of the democratic processes that transform resources into influence. It especially emphasizes that not everyone participates politically and that participants and non-participants are not randomly selected. Together these facts imply that aggregate participation rates will mediate T&T responses to income inequality, and, conversely, that income inequality will mediate T&T responses to aggregate participation rates. Specifically, since the relatively wealthy have higher propensity to participate politically, higher aggregate participation rates will generally coincide with increased democratic representation of the relatively less well-off, suggesting that democratic governments will respond to greater inequality with larger T&T increases the higher the participation rate and, vice versa, increased participation will produce larger T&T increases the more unequal the underlying income distribution. The postwar T&T experiences of developed democracies support that hypothesis empirically.
1 T&T sums direct transfers: 30 social security, 31 social assistance, and 32 welfare and pensions from National Accounts Volume II 1996 diskettes. These are nearest the welfare spending and social transfers data used elsewhere (e.g., Pampel and Williamson 1988 , Hicks and Swank 1984 , 1992 , Hicks et al. 1989 . The broad definition here includes transfers to the working and non-working. Thus, especially controlling for unemployment, the redistribution aspect of To simplify, first assume individual i's output (pre-tax income) decreases in the tax rate:
y i =y i (J), yN<0. 3 Next, consider only T&T systems that tax all income and redistribute all revenues evenly. I.e., everyone will be taxed at rate J on all their income, y i , and all resulting revenues will be redistributed equally, J3y i /N/J™ to each of N citizens. This reduces a very complicated T&T-design-and-choice problem to a simple, one-dimensional decision over a single parameter: the T&T rate, J. 4 Finally, for analytic ease, assume i's utility simply increases in her (log) disposable income:
Let subscript m denote the median-income person. A full-participation median-voter polity will implement her optimal T&T rate, found by maximizing (1) with respect to J:
The term in parentheses is the difference between average and median income (income-distribution skew). With many poor and middle-class and few-but-very rich, it is invariably positive (right-skew).
The denominator in b is the difference between the responsiveness (elasticity) of average and of the median's output to increases in J. If wealthier people respond more (have greater output-elasticity) to tax rates than do poorer-a property decreasing marginal utility of income would assure-this term will be negative, so b is positive. 6 Thus, the median's optimal T&T rate lies between zero and one (with a few simple and plausible further conditions states that marginal increases in tax rates from J=0 do not so lower the median's output that the redistributive revenues she garners do not compensate. This ensures non-zero optimal J for the median person. Condition (2b), stating that 100% tax rates reduce output to zero, ensures that the median's ideal rate is less than one. 8 Only typically because one could imagine income distribution changes that increase the skew, but, given condition (2a), the denominator in b rises in absolute value even more. 9 Several other results surround the tax-elasticity of output (i.e., the magnitudes of yN and MyN/My). E.g., the more the wealthy substitute leisure for labor relative to poor (i.e., more negative MyN/My), the more average income decreases as taxes rise, implying that the median will want less T&T. Similarly, a distribution-neutral increase in total income does not alter the income skew but does increase the denominator of b in absolute value, and so reduces the median's desired T&T. Intuitively: each case describes larger deadweight losses from taxes-because everyone is wealthier and so more willing to substitute leisure for labor or because the wealthy do so especially-so the median desires less T&T:
Hypothesis 2: The median voter's desired T&T decreases with distribution-neutral increases in aggregate income. Hypothesis 3: The more negatively output responds to taxes and the more that responsiveness increases (absolutely) with income, the less T&T the median voter desires. Unfortunately, Wagner's law confounds the testing of Hypothesis 2, and testing Hypothesis 3 would require estimates by country and individual-income-level of the tax-elasticity of output: a task well beyond the current enterprise's scope, so I list them here only to illustrate that many other hypotheses could easily be derived from this framework. 10 Only the difference between dynamic and static models matters for present purposes. That difference does not depend qualitatively on whether one models infinitely-lived family-units or finitely-lived individuals. income, y m , and the responsiveness of each to tax-rates, ™N and y m N. In particular, the core prediction of such models is that the median voter's desired T&T rate, which a pure, full-participation, medianvoter democracy will enact, typically 8 increases in the skew of pre-tax income, (™-y m ):
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Hypothesis 1: The median-income voter desires a larger T&T system the greater the pre-tax income-distribution skew.
II.B. Dynamic Considerations: the Optimal Plan
For present purposes, a reduced form capturing the relationship between growth and the T&T rate will suffice to consider dynamic issues (see Alesina and Rodrik 1994 for a full model). First, summarize the impact on growth rates, (, of investment decisions optimized given tax rates, J:
I.e., additional to the output effects from above, higher J diminishes growth increasingly. Not only do higher taxes induce some not to work as much, but they also induce some not to invest as much.
Next, simply extend the static utility from (1) to model intertemporal utility for each person i as: 10 The main differences from the static case are perfectly apparent from close comparison of 11 Analogously to Hypothesis 3 (in its intuition and in the difficulty of empirically evaluating it): Hypothesis 5: The more negatively sensitive the growth rate to increases in taxes (i.e., the more negative (N and (O), the smaller the median's desired T&T.
12 Against this incentive are arrayed the usual contrary concerns like policy-making reputation, etc.
13 Not controlling next period's J, she affects only this period's investment, which has vanishingly small impact on her utility relative to the level effects of this year's J.
Page 6 of 41 (4) and (1), so an explicit solution for the median's optimal T&T rate is not needed. The expression following the discount and growth rates, ln [@] , is just the static-model utility, so the only additional concerns in the dynamic model are that individuals discount the future (1+*) and that, beyond the output-level effects from the static case, increases in J also reduce output growth. Thus, given positive discount and growth rates, median voters prefer lower T&T rates in the dynamic than the static model. Alternatively, with more empirical relevance, the median voter desires a smaller T&T system the more she weights the future in evaluating policy (i.e., the longer are her time-horizons):
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Hypothesis 4: Median voters desire smaller T&T systems the less they discount the future.
Direct empirical evaluation of Hypothesis 4 is beyond the scope of the present paper, but certain logical extensions derived below can be at least preliminarily evaluated.
III.A. Extension: Time-Inconsistency Problems
These models assume that the intertemporally optimal T&T rate is credible and thus ignore any time-inconsistency issues. (N.b., J has no time subscript in (4), indicating that it is chosen once at time zero, is irrevocable, and is known to be so.) However, once investments that increase nextperiod income are made based on the existing J, the median voter can safely raise J, garnering more transfers without reducing growth. 12 The implications of such time-inconsistency problems can be profound (Kydland and Prescott 1977) . Suppose, e.g., that the current median voter is certain she will not be median next period and has no way of knowing who will succeed her. She would then have no way to affect next period's J; it will be whatever the next median wants. Therefore, her preferred T&T size depends only on this period's outcome, 13 and so she chooses the static optimum from (2), which, as noted in above, will be higher than the intertemporal optimum. Thus, the median-voter raises J relative to her infinite-horizon optimum as her uncertainty about the identity of next period's median-voter increases. Intuitively, greater uncertainty about the identity of next period's medianincome-voter is analogous to a higher discount rate, and Hypothesis 4 could be restated accordingly:
Corollary 4a: The median voter desires a larger T&T system the more uncertain she is that she will be the median in the future.
If, then, there were no political entities with more durable control of the policy agenda than the current median voter, democratic economies would risk serious redistributive overload. The fears (or hopes) of Marx, Mill, and the classical theorists that capitalism and democracy could not coexist might have been warranted. Representative democracy mitigates this problem because its political parties aggregate voters into smaller numbers of competing interests with correspondingly larger spaces between the median incomes of each party than those between each voter. Thus, perturbations of the income distribution have less effect on which party controls the policy agenda than they would on which voter controls it in a pure median-voter setting. 14 Since parties control the policy agenda longer on behalf of their constituencies than would median voters in pure democracy, and since parties, like firms, are long-and indefinitely-lived entities, reputationally tied to the future (Kreps 1990 ), they are less vulnerable to time-inconsistencies than individual median voters. Therefore, partisan representation renders democracy less susceptible to time-inconsistencies, thereby reducing the size of the implemented T&T system relative to pure median-voter democracy.
The comparative-static implication is simple: the longer a party expects to control policy, the more it weighs the future and so the smaller its desired T&T system. The logic extends easily to the horizon-length of any potential agenda-controlling entity. If governments effectively control policy, as in most actual democracies, then governments' expected duration of agenda-control, as opposed to some voter's or parties', establishes the relevant horizon for T&T-size determination. 15 Arguments that centrist governments, especially Christian-Democrats, favor large T&T for their own reasons (e.g., Castles 1982; Esping-Andersen 1990; Hicks and Swank 1992; Wilensky 1981) , are less amenable to translation into a single-dimensional median-voter framework. 16 The degree of electoral competition, typically operationalized as the evenness of the vote distribution across Page 8 of 41
Corollary 4b: Governments implement less T&T the longer they expect to control policy.
III.B. Extension: Partisan Redistributive Politics
Party systems are usually organized so that, when parties obtain government-control, the median voter in the median party of government does not precisely correspond to the median-income voter in society. Empirically, a system's parties more commonly jointly straddle society's median, and governments oscillate left and right around her. Even in a two-party system, parties may have extra incentive to appeal to activists who are generally more extreme than the median (Aldrich 1983a (Aldrich , 1983b (Aldrich , 1995 Aldrich and McGinnis 1989) . If so, they will not converge to society's median but rather straddle it, with the left-party median typically poorer and the right-party median typically richer than the polity's median. Equation (2) then implies directly that left parties will seek higher T&T rates than do right parties. Obviously, class-based theories relying less directly on median-voter principles (e.g., Heclo 1974; Castles 1982; Esping-Andersen 1990; Hibbs 1987; Korpi 1980 Korpi , 1983 predict similarly. 15 The critical point here is more the converse that, incorporating Aldrich's insights, government partisanship remains relevant even controlling for the position of the median voter.
Hypothesis 6: Left governments implement larger T&T systems than right governments.
III.C. Extension: Political Participation and Redistribution
The above model implicitly assumes that all of society participates equally in the democratic process and, therefore, that government policies respond to the unweighted distribution of societal
interests. Yet not everyone votes, for example, even in the most participatory democracies. Indeed, many (e.g., Dye 1979, Pampel and Williamson 1988) propose some loosely specified link between more participatory democracy and progressive policy and, assuming that larger T&T is progressive,
argue that higher voter turnout should produce more T&T. 16 Even granting the assumption, however, legislative parties, is also emphasized. This variable has not proven robustly predictive, though, so it is omitted here. 17 Using the 1980 US Census, he estimated the median income as $18,267 and the median-voter's as $20,698. 18 Nagel's finding that low turnout favors Republican presidential candidates is highly suggestive in this regard.
the effect of voter participation logically must depend on who joins the electoral pool as participation increases. Thus, while empirical correlations between voter participation and T&T size seem fairly strong (Pampel and Williamson 1988, Hicks and Swank 1992) , solid theoretical reasons to expect higher electoral participation to increase pro-transfer shares of the politically active population (e.g., greater electoral representation of the relatively poor) are more lacking. Most- Richard (1978, 1981) and political philosophers of all ideological views before them (Aristotle, Mill, Marx, and De Tocqueville alike)-simply assume that franchise expansion increases the political influence of the less well-off. This is indubitably accurate historically, but whether increases in participation
given universal suffrage produce greater government responsiveness (in terms of raising T&T) to higher inequality remains more assumed than established (but see Husted and Kenney 1997). Verba et al. (1978) , Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980), Conway (1985) , Harrop and Miller (1987) and many others have firmly established that the relatively wealthy have higher propensity to vote than the relatively poor. Nagel (1987:117-9) takes the next step to show that US voters, at least, are generally wealthier than non-voters. 17 That participation rates vary dramatically across democracies and, less so, over time is also well-established (see, e.g., Jackman and Miller 1995). Do these observations link more generally to imply that country-times with higher participation rates generally have wealthier median voters relative to median persons than those with lower rates? If so, the relationship between participation and T&T that Dye (1979) hypothesized and Pampel and Williamson (1988) and Hicks and Swank (1992) found can be derived from the models above. Next, total participation in country j at time t just sums all persons, i, with positive net voting benefit:
(5A) plus (5B) implies that country-times with higher voter participation will generally have a poorer (in relative terms) marginal voter-i.e., person for whom voting just has positive net benefits:
If this characterization of the voting decision is accurate on average, then, comparing across country-times, higher voter participation will correlate positively with increases from right (rich) to left (poor) in the proportion of the income distribution that votes. Therefore, for any given underlying median income in society, the effective median income represented by electoral input to the political process decreases in the voter-participation rate (ceteris paribus). Therefore, the raw income-skew and the voter-participation rate will interact in T&T-size determination:
Hypothesis 7: The positive effect of the raw income-distribution skew on T&T-system size (Hypothesis 1) is itself increasing in the voter-participation rate.
The new point here is two-fold. First, as just stated, the positive effect on T&T of raw income disparity should be increasing in voter participation. The logical converse is also new; the positive effect of voter participation on T&T should likewise increase in the underlying income disparity.
Generally positive effects of voter participation have been hypothesized and found before (Dye 1979 , Pampel and Williamson 1988 , Hicks and Swank 1992 ; the argument here is more subtle: the impact of increased voter-participation depends on the interests of those joining the pool of voters.
Corollary 7a:
The effect of the voter-participation rate on T&T-system size increases in the skew in the underlying income distribution.
I focused on voting above, but other modes of participation-e.g., lobbying, directly contact of representatives, campaign contributions, letters to editors, etc.-provide also political influence.
Indeed, considering the minuscule probabilities that individual votes will alter election outcomes, these other forms of participation are likely more influential than mere voting. One might wonder, therefore, whether this undermines the empirical relevance of Hypothesis 7 and Corollary 7a, but two considerations suggest to the contrary that it actually strengthens them. First, as voter-participation declines, the relative prevalence and influence of alternative modes of participation logically tend to increase. Second, socioeconomic status correlates even more strongly with other forms of political participation than with voting (Verba et al. 1978 , Rosenstone and Hansen 1993 , Verba et al. 1995 :
"[C]lass differences in mobilization typically aggravate rather than mitigate the effects of class differences in political resources," Rosenstone and Hansen (1993: 241 well represented there. For our purposes, then, voter participation legitimately summarizes political participation more generally; indeed, it was (is) intended as such in the analyses above (below).
IV.A. Data
An appropriate dependent variable for testing these hypotheses is the share of GDP allocated to transfers (T&T), which I measure by social security benefits, social assistance grants, welfare and pension payments as a share of GDP.
19 Figure 1 shows the data, and the data appendix provides descriptive statistics. The entire data set is available from [address withheld for anonymity].
To the hypotheses derived above, I add a set of controls common in the empirical literature.
First, most obviously, transfer payments should respond to unemployment, that being much of their purpose, so I control for unemployment rates (UE=internationally comparable annual figures: OECD sources 20 ). This broad definition and control are especially crucial in view of Moene and Wallerstein (1999) , who demonstrate in a different model that the median's demand for the insurance aspect of transfers, i.e., unemployment subsidies, decreases in the income-distribution skew. By using a broad definition for T&T and controlling for unemployment directly, the empirical analysis highlights the redistributive aspect of transfers, which is more-nearly monotonically increasing even in their model.
Second, as obviously, pensioners receive transfers, so I also control for that age group's share of the population (POP65=population 65+ as a percent of total: UN Demographic Yearbook). Third, many studies allow an automatic T&T response to inflation rates. On the one hand, to the degree systems are insufficiently indexed to maintain unchanged real payments, inflation will automatically reduce T&T, a ratio to GDP and so a real measure. On the other hand, systems could over-compensate for and/or societies might prod policymakers to respond over-zealously to inflation. Accordingly, I also control for inflation (CPI=consumer-price inflation: IMF sources
21
).
Empirical studies of fiscal activity also frequently employ at least six other controls without typically distinguishing whether their impacts should occur in transfers or elsewhere on the budget.
First, nearly every empirical study begins with Wagner's Law: public-sector share of total spending increases in aggregate wealth because, in short, public goods are luxuries. Note that if the law applies specifically to T&T, it contradicts Hypothesis 2 (see note 10) that distribution-neutral increases in wealth decrease T&T. The law's applicability to T&T depends on whether transfers are luxury or necessity from a national viewpoint. If transfers are luxuries-poorer countries generally eschew them, so they probably are-the estimated effect of wealth (Y=natural log of real GDP per capita: Penn World Tables 5.6) will net these two, countervailing but not logically exclusive, forces.
Second, Cameron (1978) argued and demonstrated that trade openness increases government size measured as its revenues share of GDP. Katzenstein (1985) and others argued that specifically demand for public insurance increases with trade openness, which would imply that openness spurs T&T. Garrett (1995 argues, alternatively, that openness 22 should reduce market-subverting government action but, if anything, increase market-augmenting intervention. T&T could be marketsubverting or market-augmenting depending on the system's details. Either way, controlling for trade openness (OPEN={exports+imports}/GDP: IMF sources) seems prudent.
Third, especially scholars in social-democratic-corporatist traditions stress the organizational strength of labor in the political economy (in addition to left-party strength in government). Whether union strength per se or coordinated union strength is causally relevant is debatable. I suspect that, as an impetus to T&T, whether unions coordinate in bargaining makes little difference; strong but fragmented unions will push as hard and effectively for increases in transfers. Both union density and coordination indices have produced strong results in previous empirical work, so either will likely serve well for control purposes. 23 I choose the simpler union density (UDEN=union members percent of the labor force: Golden et al. 1995) since the concept is more transparently measured.
Fourth, some scholars argue that (de-)centralization of fiscal activity can profoundly affect total government spending (e.g., Weingast et al. 1981 ) and transfers in particular (e.g., Sharpe 1988) .
Geographically fragmented fiscal policymaking may foster greater spending if coordination problems among the localities conspire to make the sum of their separate decisions exceed what the national aggregate would have chosen. Contrarily, decentralized policymaking may reduce fiscal authorities' ability to externalize the costs of their locally desired spending to the aggregate. Decentralized fiscal policymaking could also induce a "race to the bottom" as localities reduce taxes to compete for investment (Peterson 1990 ). Either of the last two suggest decentralization would reduce T&T; the first implies the opposite. To control for either possibility, I measure fiscal centralization as the central government's share of general government revenues (CTAX: OECD sources).
Penultimately, some scholars argue that complicated fiscal systems can cause fiscal illusion:
voter mis-assessment of cost and benefits of government programs. Buchanan and Wagner (1977) argue the illusion induces under-estimation of net costs, but Downs (1960) argues as logically for under-estimation of net benefits. In either case, the more complex the fiscal system, the greater the illusion, and so the more/less public overspending. Again, I am mainly concerned to control for either possibility in using indirect taxes (ITAX: complexity) and total taxes (TTAX: simplicity) as fractions of total revenues of general government (OECD sources).
Lastly among the controls: at least since Tufte (1978) , political economists have suspected incumbents of manipulating transfer payments (taxes) to rise (fall) before elections to earn electoral 24 To be precise, in election years ELE t =M/12+(d/D)/12, with M the number of complete months before election, d the day of, and D the number of days in, the incomplete month. 1-ELE t is attributed to ELE t-1 . The US, French V th Republic, and Finland are problematic, being presidential systems. Throughout, I assume simply that French and Finnish presidents and cabinets are each ½ the government and that the US president and each house are 1/3.
25 Schultz (1995) argues that, since manipulating the economy has costs (e.g., lost reputation for sound policy or costly future economic repercussions, incumbents likely employ pre-electoral manipulation only when most necessary, say, when the upcoming election is expected to be close. E.g., governments obviously cannot manipulate budgets in years prior to unforeseen elections. Thus, a more ideal measure would increase in the expected closeness of foreseen elections. Creating such a variable comparably across countries remains a project a for future research. 26 Since the unemployed and pensioners should also seek more T&T, and since age and employment status also relate to voting propensity, participation should also condition the T&T impact of unemployment and age distributions.
These hypotheses remain open empirical matters that the methodology suggested in Franzese (1999) might help address. 27 Elections to the lower house of national government only in cases where all elections do not coincide.
28 Four-year blocks will each contain exactly one presidential election-year in the US; thus, the measure smooths the likely-spurious upward spikes in measured electorally relevant population that would otherwise occur there.
boons from voters. Accordingly, I add a control variable equal to 1 in pre-election years (ELE). 24, 25 Turning to the core arguments, Hypothesis 1 argued that T&T increases with the gap from median to mean income in society. Hypothesis 7 and its corollary extended that familiar proposition, noting that this relationship should itself increase with voter-participation rates.
26 Thus, we need measures of raw (pre-T&T) inequality and effective participation rates, each of which is problematic. Obtaining comparable annual measures of income disparity is notoriously more difficult.
Hypotheses 1 and 7 require specifically the skew of the income distribution, i.e., mean relative to median. GDP per capita gauges the latter directly. Unfortunately, median income proved impossible to measure cross-nationally and cross-temporally comparably so directly, so I suggest an alternative expedient. Take pre-tax manufacturing-wages (w: IMF sources) and GDP per capita (y), each indexed to 100 in 1986. Then, to the degree manufacturing workers are median actors or their wageincome plight reasonably tracks that of median actors, y/w yields a cross-time, within-country 29 [reference suppressed] provides further details on this variable and the arguments and assumptions underlying its use as a measure of income skew.
30 I also considered proxies for income skew using several inequality indices from the LIS. I constructed a broadcoverage estimate of a comparable GINI index thus. Take sets of country-specific-estimates of GINI and other indices, (from annual 1967-90 data for the US to one observation in Greece and New Zealand), scale other indices to GINI by linear regression, and fill years between observations by linear extrapolation. Then forecast and "back-cast" to 1950-95 using Box-Jenkins techniques. Make the series cross-country comparable by repeating the above process for ratios of available comparative-study indices to the country-specific series just generated. The resulting index performed broadly similarly to the RW measure, which I consider better, though with larger standard errors. 31 Hypothesis 4 and its corollaries related T&T positively to median voter's discount-rates or uncertainty and negatively to policymakers' expected-duration of agenda-control. Although neither concept is directly measurable, I make some attempt. First, if variation within the income distribution over time correlates with variation of its skew over time-intuitively appealing, but not strictly necessary-then a (five-year, centered) moving standard-deviation of RW, SDRW, approximates the median's uncertainty that she will remain such. Second, policymakers' expected-duration of agendacontrol will be well approximated by the inverse of the actual duration of current government (i.e., their hazzard rate: HR) to the degree governments control the agenda, hazard rates are constant within government, and governments' predictions of their own hazard rates have small mean-squared error (government-duration data from Woldendorp et al. 1994 , 1998 and Lane et al. 1991 ).
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Hypothesis 6, finally, predicts that left governments implement larger T&T systems than right, even controlling for participation-adjusted median-voter income. To measure partisanship, I
first compiled a data base coding all parties that have been in government in 21 democracies since 1945 from 0 at far left to 10 at far right. 32 The codes rescale and then average previously published expert-indices for that party given in Laver and Hunt (1992) and Laver and Schofield (1991) . Using these codes and the number of cabinet ministers of each party in every government (from Lane et al. 1991 , supplemented by Woldendorp et al. 1994 , 1998 , I obtain an average left-right position of each government, calling the resulting measure its partisan center of gravity (CoG).
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IV.B. Methodology
Tests reveal that T&T may have a unit root, 34 so simple lagged-dependent-variable methods could be highly misleading. An error-correction model (ECM) is advised. Beck (1992) suggests an alternative, requiring less stark a priori decisions about which variables cointegrate, to the common two-stage ECM method. Simply regress the change in the dependent variable on (a) its lagged level, (b) its lagged differences as necessary, (c) the lagged level of each potential cointegrating factor, and (d) whatever other levels or differences of independent variables theory or empirics may suggest. The one-step method is asymptotically equivalent to the two-stage method and produces statistically valid estimates provided the coefficient on the lagged dependent-variable level is comfortably negative.
35
Interpretation of ECM coefficients is intuitive. Coefficients on the changes in and levels of independent variables reflect "transitory" momentum-like and "permanent" equilibrium-like effects, respectively. Both accumulate and dissipate geometrically over time through the coefficients on the lagged dependent-variable level, which reflects slow adjustment of levels to equilibrium relations, and those on its lagged differences (if present), which reflect slow adjustment of momentum in changes. "Transitory" effects are the effects of changes in X on changes in Y. If X increases once and remains at the new level, the transitory impulse to Y given by the coefficient on )X also lasts only that one period and then dissipates as determined by the estimated dynamics in Y. Contrarily, 36 Moreover, even if the one-stage ECM does not actually encompass a cointegrating relationship and yet the coefficient on the lagged level of the dependent variable remains very highly significantly negative-i.e., if unit-root concerns were actually unfounded-the regression is still interpretable in this way. 37 Also, if direct, indirect, or central taxes primarily finance transfers, estimating contemporaneous effects of tax-structure would greatly risk endogeneity. Lagging a year allows one to control for last year's T&T, ameliorating the danger. Economic variables, esp. unemployment, also risk simultaneity, but their main purpose here is to control for economic conditions when estimating other effects more central to present arguments, so less concern regards misestimating their impact than would regard poorly instrumenting for them and so undermining their strength as controls.
Page 18 of 41 the "permanent" effects given by the coefficients on X model long-run or equilibrium relationships between the levels of X and Y. By these, the same one-time, permanent increase in X produces a permanent change in the level of Y as propagated through the latter's estimated dynamics.
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In this application, some variables should affect T&T virtually automatically and immediately (UE, POP65, CPI, )Y) but may also have longer-run effects, perhaps operating through the changes they induce in the polity's structure of interests. For example, larger over-65 populations increase the share of the population drawing pensions, which would raise T&T directly, but may also increase political pressures on policymakers to enlarge T&T, creating an indirect longer-term effect. Such variables enter the model in contemporaneous differences and lagged levels. Other variables relate directly to the current government (ELE, CoG, HR). These too should have immediate effects that may also persistent, so they also enter in current differences and lagged levels. The third category (CTAX, ITAX, TTAX, UDEN, SDRW, VP, RW, VP@RW) relates to the interests or perceptions of the polity and so need time to work from there through government representation to affect policy, but they should have persistent impacts once they have done so. Thus, these variables enter in lagged level only. 37 These considerations combine to produce the following equation for estimation:
where C is the set of time-series-cross-section controls determined to be appropriate: (a) one lagged 38 Further Methodological Notes:
(1) The use of cross-section dummies is disputed in time-series-cross-section analysis. If they are absent but should be present, results can be misleading, but, if present, they monopolize cross-national variance in thoroughly unsatisfying ways theoretically. Here, Wald tests rejecting their omission were too significant to ignore: p<.000001.
(2) I include the non-democracy indicator (DICT) and three lags of it (p..035) to parallel the period covered by the moving-average in VP. Since VP, CoG, ELE, and HR involve arbitrary assumptions about non-democracy, including DICT also prudently ensures that non-democratic country-years do not overly influence our estimates.
(3) Controlling for )T&T t-1 , Ljung-Box Q and Lagrange-multiplier tests fail by large margins to reject nulls of no remaining serial correlation in residuals.
(4) Finally, I include )T&T~i ,t to bring spatial correlation of the dependent variable into the model's systematic component. This should add some efficiency to the consistency of the Beck-Katz PCSE's, which I also applied. 39 The usable sample is US, Japan, Germany, France, Italy, UK, Canada, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and Australia from as early as 1956 through as late as 1991 (the sample is not quite rectangular due to some missing data).
40 Its large |t|>4.3 would likely satisfy ADF tests, so inferences should be free of unit-root concerns. )Y t , is an economic condition entering in current-differences, )()Y t ), and lagged-levels, )Y t-1 .
Hypothesis 2 (see note 10) and Wagner's Law, in turn, argue for the inclusion of wealth levels, Y t-2 .
The next section uses the postwar experiences of developed democracies 39 to estimate (6) and applies the results to evaluate the emergent positive political economy of T&T-size determination. of that into the next year, etc. Thus, the long-run effect of any permanent shock is .06 -1 =16.7± times its immediate impact, and 11 (37) years pass before 50% (90%) of such long-run effect accumulates.
V. Evaluating the Positive Political Economy of Tax-and-Transfer Systems
The discussion proceeds next quickly through the economic-conditions and other controls suggested in the literature (see [reference suppressed] for more-detailed discussion of the estimation results). Not surprisingly, unemployment has a statistically strong (p.0) positive impact on T&T;
+1% UE induces an immediate 0.22% of GDP increase. Longer-term effects are small though; a permanent +1% UE induces an insignificant (p..24) .2% of GDP long-run T&T decline. If anything, the rising costs of transfers stemming from persistently higher unemployment eventually persuade 41 If these point estimates are trusted, the substantive effect is non-negligible though. +1% POP65 induces just 0.14% of GDP higher T&T immediately, but an appreciable 0.44% of GDP long-run T&T increase if permanent. governments to reduce their largesse slightly. Inflation also has quite statistically significant (p.0) immediate but negligible, insignificant long-term effect (p..46). While statistically clear, even the former is small; +1% CPI reduces T&T only 0.04% of GDP. Thus, transfers are generally slightly inadequately indexed to inflation, but neither statistically nor substantively significantly so longerterm. Lastly, the T&T impact of the age distribution, though positive as expected, is surprisingly weak statistically (p..32, .38, and .44 in changes, levels, and jointly). Likely, this low significance arises because the upward trend in over-65 population-shares was very common across the sample, and so the control for the average T&T in other countries each year would have absorbed its effect.
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The T&T effects of growth and wealth are more interesting; e.g., the immediate and longerterm negative T&T effects of growth, given in the coefficients on )()Y t ) and )Y t-1 respectively, are both very strong statistically (p.0) and substantively. Counter to this, though, the effect of wealth is positive and moderately significant (p..07). However, these are the effects of changes in growth, keeping wealth constant, and of changes in wealth, keeping growth constant. Neither is logically possible, so substantive interpretation requires counterfactual examples. Consider a permanent 1% increase in real-per-capita growth. The automatic impact of growth in reducing transfers dominates in the first 10-12 years, during which the higher growth rate reduces T&T 3±% of GDP. After that, Wagner's venerable law dramatically takes over, producing an explosive increase in T&T as wealth accumulates ever more rapidly. A more substantive example: OECD-average real-GDP-per-capita increased from 4200 to 13400 (constant 1985 $US) over the postwar era, though at slowing growth rates. The estimated T&T response to that path, reflecting both the automatic impact of growth and the accumulating impact of Wagner's Law, would have been a fairly steadily-accumulated 6.25%
of GDP increase in T&T (see [reference suppressed] for graphical analysis).
42 OPEN, CTAX, and ITAX, but not TTAX, become more significant in models without country fixed-effects.
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Moving to the controls from the literature, neither trade openness nor any of the tax-structure variables seem significantly related to T&T. However, these variables also exhibit mostly crossnational variation: trade-openness (82% of total), fiscal centralization (80%), indirect tax-shares (60%), and total tax-shares (52%). Thus, this regression, in which country fixed-effects absorb all cross-national variation, was biased against finding effects for such variables.
42 Even so, the estimate for indirect taxes, substantively largest (a permanent +10% ITAX yielding a long-run 1.4% of GDP T&T rise) and statistically most-significant (t.1), suggests that non-negligible fiscal-illusion might be present. Contrarily, despite much recent debate, these estimates, if trusted, suggest that there is little to gain or fear from decentralizing T&T. Neither a competitive race downward (Peterson 1990) nor an overspending-inducing collective-action-problem (Weingast et al. 1981) appears. The effect of openness, finally, may be just-noticeable-by these untrustworthy estimates, a permanent +10%
OPEN produces a long-run .27% of GDP T&T rise-but there is far too little cross-time variation in OPEN to obtain a sufficiently precise estimate (t<.5) to warrant further comment. 43 Likely, some combination of the following explains how so many previous studies missed this evidence. First, Tufte's (1978) emphasis on pre-electoral manipulation of transfers policy seems well-founded but has been too-often ignored (cf., Schultz 1995). Since policymakers wish economic gifts to arrive around election time, directly manipulable outcomes, like transfer-payments, will be the tools of choice. Second, the dynamics of the policy variables in question and those of the electoral cycle itself have received insufficient attention. Transfers, like most fiscal policies, re-adjust neither automatically nor quickly, and democratic competition involves campaigns before and sometimes changes in policymakers after elections. Third, previous empirical studies focused too often on frequent-election countries like the US where budget-cycle magnitudes will be small (see below). Political scientists may have prematurely abandoned electoral-budget-cycle theory; rumors of its empirical demise have been greatly exaggerated. Economists returned to reconsider Nordhaus ' (1975) political business cycles from a rational-expectations macroeconomics view, culminating in equilibrium budget cycles (Rogoff and Sibert 1988, Rogoff 1990) . The results here suggest that political scientists should likewise return to Tufte's (1978) Political Control of the Economy; more politics are afoot than mere election-year dummy-variables will locate. E.g., Schultz (1995) argues and finds (see note 25) that policymakers will not manipulate T&T equally before every election (as the operationalization here also implicitly assumes); likely they manipulate only to the degree close elections are foreseen. Estimates here and elsewhere effectively average such variations, underestimating (over-estimating) electoral manipulation in close contests (landslides). 44 Leads and lags up to five years on the pre-election-year indicator were considered. Only these two years were significant, and comfortably so in all specifications attempted.
Turning from societal characteristics to those of government, pre-electoral manipulation of transfers is strongly evident, contrary to some recent pessimism about such electoral budget-cycles in the literature (e.g., Alesina et al. 1997) . 43 Coefficients on )ELE t and ELE t-1 reveal that transfers rise in the year before an election by 0.10±% of GDP (p..05) and increase 0.12±% of GDP (p..02) further the year after an election (joint significance: p..03). An extra 0.22% of GDP is noticeable electoral manipulation in itself, but, given the slow adjustment of T&T, and since all democracies hold elections minimally every five years, the impact of one pre-electoral manipulation has hardly faded when another, perhaps conducted by a different government, occurs. Figure 2 illustrates the interesting implications, three aspects of which merit particular attention.
First, the cycle peaks the year after an election. 44 I can propose three possible reasons for this.
It may just reflect, uninterestingly, lingering differences between calendar-and fiscal-year measured ELE and T&T. It could, nearly as uninterestingly, simply reflect slow budgeting processes that delay post-election governments' retrenchment of election-year largesse. Or, it might reflect the fact that pre-election and post-election policymakers sometimes differ and that, once in office, candidates T-2  T0  2  4  6  8  10  12  14  16  18  20  22  24  26  28  30  32  34  36  38  40  42  44  46  48 
Figure 2: Estimated T&T Responses to a Single Election and to Regular Elections of Various Frequencies
more credibly win more often. Then, while pools of pre-election policymakers (incumbents) will contain some who seek to buy votes by increasing current transfers, post-election pools will contain returned incumbents and freshman who, more frequently still, promised greater still transfers because some incumbents will have promised/given too-few transfers and so lost. Indeed, this would also explain the slightly larger and more-significant coefficient on ELE t-1 than on )ELE t .
Second, the frequency of elections also has sizable impact on long-run T&T-system size.
Democracies with elections every 2 (3,4) years accumulate over 1% (0.5%, 0.2%) of GDP higher T&T than those with elections every 5 years. This, as noted above, is because T&T adjusts slowly enough for one pre-electoral manipulation to linger into the next. How much remains depends on the time between elections, so democracies with more-frequent elections accumulate greater long-run T&T. Third, for the same reason, the amplitude of electoral T&T cycles is increasing in the time between elections: .01%, .07%, .12%, and .14% of GDP for 2-, 3-, 4-, and 5-year cycles respectively. 45 Previous results were likely over-stated for statistical reasons now better-understood. Pampel and Williamson (1988) and Hicks and Swank (1992) find significant positive effects for left parties; the latter also find strong interactions between government and opposition partisanship. However, both employed FGLS procedures Beck and Katz (1995, 1997) subsequently demonstrated to be problematic in samples where T does not greatly exceed N. In the former, N>T, so estimation was mathematically undefined, but they also reported a simple, defined lagged-dependent-variable model. There, left-party effects were positive but insignificant. In the latter, T=23>N=18, so the results presented were defined, but Beck and Katz estimate that FGLS standard errors in a sample that size are likely 3 to 4 times over-confident. Thus, the results here are likely actually somewhat stronger than true there. They also found center parties as or more expansive in welfare spending than the left. This possibility was not considered here, confounding the comparison. Finally, Hicks et al. (1989) estimate an IV-GLS model by Cochrane-Orcutt with fixed effects. They find left governments in corporatist countries raise transfers with t.2: slightly stronger support than found here. They also noted but did not report negligible effects in other democracies, so averaging across all democracies as done here may dampen partisanship estimates. The present results are thus much less surprising and even about the same as others in light of these reinterpretations.
Page 25 of 41
The US, with presidents and representative elected every 4 and 2, and 1/3 of the Senate every 2 years (all in early November), has an odd electoral-cycle pattern that illustrates all three points. ELE codes this cycle {.05, .28, .11, .66}, ending the presidential-election year. Given the estimated T&T dynamics and the coefficients on )ELE t and ELE t-1 , this pattern produces an equilibrium T&T cycle of {1.07, 1.04, 1.02, 1.04}. The US cycle peaks the year after the presidential election; and, compared to a simple 4-year cycle (0,0,0,1Y1.00,.95, .88,.93), the US cycle has smaller amplitude and larger long-run T&T: the former because off-presidential-election years still have some electoral activity and so induce a T&T response; the latter because, relatedly, of its more-frequent elections.
I turn now to the impact of the political-economic conditions emphasized in Hypotheses 1-7. 46 Permanent partisan shifts are unlikely in democracies, but 90% of long-run T&T effects occur within 37 years, which Swedish Socialists and Japanese Liberal Democrats (and many others in coalition) exceeded. 47 Conversely, when the effect of income inequality is analyzed below, recall that it is the effect controlling for the partisanship of government. Similar interpretations, of course, apply to all the effects estimated here. T0  2  4  6  8  10  12  14  16  18  20  22  24  26  28  30  32  34  36  38  40  42  44  46  48 apart and to exchange office every four and one year(s) respectively. As shown, partisan T&T cycles are typically moderate (0.2% of GDP amplitude) in majoritarian democracies but tend to be tiny in coalitional democracies (0.05% of GDP). Thus, the T&T effects of government partisanship, while perhaps noticeable and occasionally appreciable, are not usually very large, controlling for the structure of interests in society, and especially among voters, that elected those governments.
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Corollaries 4a and 4b argued that the median-income-voter's uncertainty that she will remain such and that the current government's uncertainty that it will remain in office should each increase transfers. This regression gives no evidence that government instability raises transfers. If anything, .92, and .56 for change, level, and joint effects). The moderately significant (p..07) coefficient on SDRW, contrarily, suggests that a standard deviation rise in income-distribution volatility (+0.023) induces almost +1% of GDP T&T in the long run. However, income volatility fluctuated more than trended in this sample (OECD-average SDRW is just 5±% of its total variation), suggesting that skew volatility might explain some country-time-unique variation in T&T but not much of its crosscountry shared time-path. Figure 4 illustrates the variation across country-times in income-skew volatility and its impact on T&T in three countries with widely differing experiences.
The US experienced moderate fluctuations in T&T responses to greater skew volatility until the sharply increasing SDRW in the eighties triggered steadily rising upward pressure. Germany saw smooth and steady downward political pressure on T&T from a population feeling (less-smoothly) falling income-skew volatility, until post-unification turmoil reversed both trends dramatically. Italy, finally, saw T&T rise in response to a sharp increase in skew volatility in the early-sixties, as a lesswealthy economy expanded quickly through the ranks, followed by more erratic volatility thereafter.
Thus, increasing median-voter uncertainty over their future place in the income-distribution creates upward popular pressure on T&T, but governmental tenure-uncertainty has no significant effect. This may suggest that time inconsistency is less a problem for T&T systems than it has proven for other policies. Perhaps policymakers find ex post levies easier to apply with relatively fluid and technocratic instruments like monetary policy, where voters need some economic sophistication to notice the levy extraction, than in stickier and simpler policies like T&T: no economic expertise is needed to notice a larger tax bill. The T&T response to SDRW may instead reflect citizens' demands for social insurance against income volatility (see, e.g., Iversen and Cusack 1998, Garrett and Mitchell 1999) . Alternatively, time-inconsistencies could be as strong in T&T as elsewhere but more evident in response to individual than governmental uncertainty because some other consideration induces governments to reduce transfers as their expected tenure decreases. Governments, e.g., may
be secure precisely because they raise transfers. For now, only that income-skew volatility correlates moderately positively with T&T while government instability does not is safe to conclude. to Hypothesis 7. Graphics will again help interpret the substance of these results since the effects reflected in the coefficients on interactive terms and the standard errors of those effects depend upon, and so can only be interpreted as a function of, the levels of each variable (Franzese et al. 1999 ).
The top-left of Figure 5 plots estimated short-run T&T responses to a 0.1 rise in the index of underlying income-skew, as a function of voter-participation rates over the sample range of VP; 48 The labels are informative as VP variation is 68% cross-national, excluding non-democracies. Voter Participation Rate (%) 2  T0  2  4  6  8  10  12  14  16  18  20  22  24  26  28  30  32  34  36  38  40  42  44  46  48 T-2  T0  2  4  6  8  10  12  14  16  18  20  22  24  26  28  30  32  34  36  38  40  42  44  46  48 
VI. Conclusions
Concluding, I turn to the other question raised at the start: how well can the positive political economy of tax-and-transfer systems, as expanded here, explain the similarities and differences in postwar T&T experiences of developed democracies? Table 2 begins an answer, giving short-and long-run effects of standard-deviation increases in each independent variable. As seen, the factors with largest impact were economic conditions-unemployment, inflation, growth, and wealth-plus labor-organizational strength, electioneering, government partisanship, income volatility, and the interactions of income skew and voter participation stressed here. Also age-demographics and taxstructure complexity possibly made some contribution. These factors together can explain almost an adjusted half of the total variation in T&T experiences depicted in Figure 1 . 
NOTES:
Short-run impacts are estimated first-year effects of 1-standard-deviation increases in independent variables. Long-run impacts are estimated long-run effects of permanent 1-standard-deviation increases in independent variables. *=p..10, **=p..05, ***=p..01; two-sided. Short-run impact for ELE combines the two-year T&T-impulses from one election; the long-run impact reflects a permanent increase in electoral frequency from every 5 to every 2 years.
The OECD-average T&T trend, +14.5% of GDP T&T 1950-93, seems to have stemmed from common growth and wealth developments primarily. OECD-average real-GDP-per-capita, trending upward at slowing growth rates, accounts for +6% of GDP T&T, over 40% of total trend, including both growth slow-down and wealth-accumulation effects. Structural-political developments also had strong effects. E.g., labor-organizational strength:
a standard-deviation rise in union density (+16%) would induce +2.1% of GDP T&T, a substantively and statistically significant amount. Voter fiscal illusion and the complexity of revenue-generation may also have been important: its T&T-effect magnitude would equal estimated demographic effects if its mildly insignificant coefficient is trusted. However, unionization and tax-complexity trends (up-then-down and toward simplicity) worked against the upward transfers trend, pushing for increased-then-decreased and decreased T&T, ±.25% and -1.4% of GDP respectively. Election-years, electoral frequency, partisanship, and income-distribution volatility similarly played important roles in explaining cross-country-average and country-time-unique variation, but none had much OECDshared time-path, and so none were central to the shared upward T&T trend.
Voter participation and income skew, contrarily, added strongly to transfers trends in some countries; standard-deviation adverse shifts in either adds +3% of GDP T&T where both were high, though they were less central in country-times where one or both were low. As Figure 6 showed, the OECD-average paths of VP and RW actually account for a sizable +1% of GDP average.
Thus, the full political-economic model can explain about half the common trend in transfers (6+1.7+1 -1.4%=7.3% of 14.5%) and also about half the shared fluctuation around that upward trend, which together represent about 46% of total variance in T&T. And the interaction of participation and inequality stressed here is an important element of that explanation. Moreover, despite failing to render the atheoretical country-indicators statistically redundant, the model could also explain almost half the variation across country-averages in T&T, 43±% of the total. Table 3 demonstrates. -3% 24% -2% -11% 245% 5% -10% 30% 25% 5% -9% 0% 5% 10% 314% -250% 63% 100%
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Var. Table lists the level of T&T after 35 years of constant levels and changes at that country's postwar-average levels and changes. Some estimates not significant (see Table 1 ). The antepenultimate and ultimate rows are the preceding rows' as a percent of the cross-sectional average and variance, respectively, which latter are given as the italicized entries of the last column.
The last few rows of Table 3 show that the key conditions behind cross-country variation in T&T-size are not transitory macroeconomic conditions like growth, unemployment, and inflation but more-durable socioeconomic conditions like, especially, aggregate wealth and, also though lessso, society's age distribution. Note that such factors foster governments T&T largesse at least partly through their effects on the polity's structure of interests. Economic forces, while important, do not solely drive either the relationship between aggregate wealth and T&T-size or that between agedemographics and T&T-size. Wealthier and older polities also demand more social transfers from their governments as a normative luxury (i.e., Wagner's Law) and because more citizens benefit directly from public pensions and so work to increase/defend them politically.
Moreover, after wealth, the most important factors behind cross-national variation in T&T-size are, first, voter participation and the income skew and, second, labor-organizational strength.
These factors foster larger T&T systems via their impacts on the share of the population favoring transfers (income skew, blue-collar shares of employment) and on the effectiveness with which those societal preferences are brought to bear upon government (political-participation rates and labororganizational strength). Finally, the only other factor with appreciable cross-sectional importance is revenue-generation complexity (ITAX); again, varying fiscal illusion, though not quite statistically significant, could perhaps have substantively sizable effects.
In sum, while shared exposure to macroeconomic shocks explains much of the OECD-shared time path of T&T; broader socio-political conditions, again including especially the participationinequality interaction stressed here, tended to drive the wide variation across democracies. Swiss budgeting added to T&T there, though CTAX is highly insignificant.
Concluding empirically: wealth (Y), participation-adjusted income-disparity (VP@RW), and labor-organizational strength (UDEN), with less input from three other factors-fiscal complexity (ITAX), age demographics (POP65), and growth (dY)-can explain almost half (45%) of the crosssectional variation among developed democracies in postwar-average T&T size. These same factors, especially wealth and growth but also the others, plus other economic conditions like unemployment and inflation, explain also explain almost half the shared time-path of T&T: a 14±% upward trend, with fluctuations fairly well-explained by macroeconomic conditions. Finally, other considerations, like election-year politics (ELE), government partisanship (CoG), and income-distribution volatility (SDRW) also exhibited statistically significant and, in some country-times, substantively large impacts. These last add to the others in explaining the variation that is unique to particular countrytimes. A very rough calculation of the amounts explained might be: 45% of cross-country variation, which is 43% of the total, explained, plus 50% of the shared time-path, which is 46% of the total, explained gives approximately 43% of total variation explained so far. The complete model explains R 2 =51%, so the model explains 51%-43%=8% more than just accounted, which is fully 85% of the country-time-unique variation that remains. In other words, the positive political economy of taxand-transfers, as extended here, performs moderately well in telling 40-50% of the cross-national and shared cross-time stories, and especially well in explaining individual country-years' deviations from their postwar average and the shared time-path, i.e., loosely, at the margins.
Concluding more theoretically, many of the arguments offered here or drawn from previous literature provide appreciable explanatory leverage, and, in particular, the core prediction of the basic neoclassical model receives support here as it has not elsewhere. 52 Democratic governments do seem to respond to medians' desires for larger transfers as the income skew rises; however, what matters theoretically and empirically is the income distribution among the politically relevant subset of the population. The key point here is that size and composition of that subset (critically, the share and parts of the income distribution it represents) varies across democracies over time depending on the interaction of their political (electoral) institutions and economic structure. Specifically, democratic pressure for redistribution derives from the difference between the median-voter's income and that of the population-(tax-payer-) average's income. Thus, the effective political pressure emanating from some degree of income disparity in the economy depends on the relative political participation of different income groups, which, in turn, depends on institutions that foster or hinder turnout because the relatively well-off vote and otherwise participate effectively everywhere while the lesswell-off participate much more effectively only where they turnout to vote. 
